January 8,2006

從越南工人的罷工看越南的政治

VN-worker-strike.JPG
越南的政治,雖然沒有透過民主選舉制度來產生的議會,但政策過程卻必須考慮一般民眾的感受。他是一種混合著西方「利益團體」政治競爭以及傳統「家父長制」意識型態的政治體制,也因此越南的政治通常不會走向極端,而且多少還貼近人民的生活.(圖為受影響的某廠商工人工作狀況)

過年前後,在外資集中地區的胡志明市附近,「又」發生罷工,但這次比較不同的是,規模比之前大許多,而且有串連的趨勢。經過一週的騷動,工人終於取得了他們的要求:提高每個月的基本工資到美金55元。這樣的過程一點也不奇怪:這是越南政治過程的常態,台灣的人若由此推斷台商會撤資,那表示對於越南政經的陌生。

我們一般對於越南的想像總不外:國民所得低、貧窮、一黨專政、沒有民主。這樣的初步印象也不能說是錯誤,但是若是習慣地拿中國大陸一黨專政來做類比,那就大錯特錯了。越南的一黨專政是具有「內部派系競爭」的一黨專政,不同的派系有自己的利益,因此在利益表達上面,底層人民的聲音並非無法上傳。到目前為止,還有許多「革命元老」活著,他們住在鄉村地區,是地區的領導者,因此許多地方的聲音可以透過他們來傳達。

一個鮮明的例子是1997年的太平省農民抗稅、抗議事件,因為地方官員貪污腐化,不僅拿了公款自己花用,還要另立名目課稅。太平省是當年越南對抗法國殖民者的重要「革命根據地」,但卻演變成大規模抗議暴動,在不同地區的農民同時與公安、政府官員發生衝突,造成一些傷亡;後續的抗議則是數千名農民騎著腳踏車到河內集體抗議陳情,要求撤換貪官污吏。這樣的抗議示威一直延續到1998年中,後來政府採取兩面手法來處理,一方面以軍隊來恢復秩序,另方面撤職查辦省黨部書記及數百名黨政官員。

這次胡志明市的工人抗議,也有類似的影子存在。罷工的主要兩個原因:實質工資的下降,以及利益團體的折衝擺不平。但政府的處理手法則類似。

外資工廠的基本工資已經超過六、七年沒有調整,而且自從2000年八月起,外資工廠可以支付越南幣,不是美金,當越南幣不斷貶值時,工人以美金換算的薪水就越來越少。如果對照於越南每年平均高達8%的經濟成長率,以及每年約3~4%的物價上漲率,這樣的薪水根本是逐年在減少。根據我的計算,目前一個勞工在胡志明市大概需要80100萬盾才能有「適當的」生活,但目前的基本工資只有63萬盾,所以只能靠加班來維持此最低生活費用。

此外,越南政府也知道工人的實質工資在下降,因此在兩年前就提議提高工人最低工資,但來自各國的商會(例如台商會)、越南當地的雇主協會、主管經濟的政府官員,都反對調薪,說法很熟悉:提高工資會增加成本,降低競爭力。去年的年中本來已說好要在今年的一月一日開始提高薪資(兩個方案,一個是提高到55美元,一個是50美元),但顯然工會要提高到55美元,雇主只希望50美元,可能協調不好,所以預計延期到今年四月。

但越南工會基本上相當有影響力,去年的調薪沒搞定,連帶讓基層員工、基層工會「人心浮動」,我們不知道上層工會在此次罷工扮演的角色,但顯然這些基層工會是有備而來,透過串連罷工抗議手段來逼迫政府表態。最後就是政府宣布基本工資調高到55美元,且從二月一日起算。此外,政府也認為,已經對「子民」很好了,所以不應該繼續罷工,也逐漸以強硬手段來處理罷工事件。

這樣的政策制訂,明顯看到越南的政治,雖然沒有透過民主選舉制度來產生的議會,但政策過程卻必須考慮一般民眾的感受。他是一種混合著西方「利益團體」政治競爭以及傳統「家父長制」意識型態的政治體制,也因此越南的政治通常不會走向極端,而且多少還貼近人民的生活。


Posted by hongzen63 at 樂多Roodo! │17:36 │回應(7)引用(1)越南政治
樂多分類:學術/學習 工具:編輯本文
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火燒之島:要揚威國際也不是這樣搞的!前年在香港做田野的時候,有天遇到一位剛從深圳歸來的香港朋友
〈網摘〉台商跨國壓迫 VS. 工運跨國串連【迷幻機器】 at April 24,2006 23:05
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看你這篇文章,真叫人對你的觀察力,拍手叫好!

我已將你的網站登入在小弟的站內,希望你不嫌棄?...祝你新年順利美滿。

你可能對政治方面有涉獵,你的分析還真有獨到的看法。
越南至今給我的看法是很溫和的體制,一點都看不出它是共產黨的國家,但某方面也是很專制,所以水者只看他們遇事件的處理方式,說真的,他們有點怕事件搞大,常用拖延戰術,反倒人民的行動力有超前趨勢。

罷工事件不是第一次,這次卻是最大,台商也是受害最多,才有台商想退出越南(我總覺得這是台商的另類恐嚇的手段)!...越南政府還是不敢馬上執行升薪資?!也由這裡看出,越南的工會力量之驚人,可別小看越南工會,就常看要去投資的商人說只要給工會一點甜頭就能控制了!

一旦出事,台商才知其力量之大,...這是水者看法,參考了!
Posted by 水者 at February 12,2006 22:34
歡迎多連結,多傳播相關知識。

我也常上貴網站看看最新的消息,新的地圖中文版,真感謝如此費心,我也下載了一份。在你的網站,真的看得到一般人的生活,不是媒體亂剪接胡扯的報導,有趣多了。
(也請多保重舊傷了!)
Posted by 阿仁 at February 13,2006 08:41
謝謝阿仁兄的關心,小弟的舊傷還在複健中,手臂還是酸痛中!

也謝謝你同意超連結,同好的氣度不一樣就是不一樣。

唉,地圖還在等小劉兄的回應,不過你若有心,自己整理一下就可得。
越資訊以前真貧瘠,現在卻是太多而呈雜亂無章,也是要有心人來整理,你的這方論述就無人去論斷,所以水者也來此吸收一些養份,不然一些觀念會太僵化,再次感恩你的無私心得。
Posted by 水者 at February 14,2006 22:57
現在三月了
到處還有罷工
日本大公司也有罷工

我們公司這次也有罷工
不過跟你研究的案件完全不同

據本人調查
本公司是台幹不爽老闆
秘密策動當地員工也趕時髦罷工
基層工人在廠外示威叫囂
真正導演卻裝得忠誠之至

後來一堆基層工人被開除
我跟老闆說這些人單純善良
不應該開除
老闆竟說
這些人自己笨蛋才會被人利用
活該被開除

聽到老闆這番話
我想若繼續在這公司上班
我肯定早晚會變成利用下屬搞罷工
修理自己老闆的奸人
Posted by 罷工 at March 7,2006 01:24
真是太神奇的例子了

我剛從越南回來,也聽了一些工人罷工的新聞消息
原來策動罷工的人,還包括了公司內部的權力鬥爭

一位朋友的公司,由工會的越南高階幹部帶頭罷工
提出來的加薪條件,都是對於中高階人員有利的方案,
一般基層員工根本沒賺頭

在世界各國的罷工,多少是用「道德」與「強制」的方式在進行
越南的情況大概也不例外吧!
有工人「膽敢」進入工廠工作,可能一出門就被打個 半死
Posted by 阿仁 at March 29,2006 21:02
這是最新一期的ASEAN Focus刊出有關此次罷工的評論,值得參考。(http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/about.html)

Vietnam: The Big Strikes: Did the Government "Cave In" to Workers or Did it Lead Them?

Beginning late in 2005, tens of thousands of Vietnamese workers downed tools at dozens of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in southern industrial zones around Ho Chi Minh City. While strikes are legal and common in Vietnam - there have been some 900 reported since 1995 - this wave of strikes was the most massive in recent Vietnamese history.

Most reportage indicated that this wave of strikes was brought to a close around 6 January 2006 when the Vietnamese government allegedly 'caved in' to the strikers demands for a 40-48 per cent pay increase and other demands.

The 28 January Economist reported:

'What is especially unsettling for investors is how the workers got their extra dough. Since late December, wildcat strikes have swept through the industrial zones surrounding Ho Chi Minh City. Apparently caught off-guard, the government issued a decree earlier this month raising the minimum wage in foreign-owned factories & investors are fuming over production stoppages and a higher wage bill.'

However, the fact that the Vietnamese government can tell foreign investors that it is doing them a service in ending the wave of strikes by giving the workers a victory and decreeing a large wage rise appears tongue in cheek, as the government had decreed the wage rises long before this wave of strikes.

As the Vietnamese daily Saigon Giai Phong (Liberated Saigon) had reported on 25 September 2005, 'The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs has called on FDI (foreign direct invested) enterprises to increase the minimum wages they pay their employees. It wants firms based in Hanoi, HCM City, Dong Nai and Binh Duong to pay at least 870,000 Dong (about US$55) per month, those in Hai Phong, Ha Long, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Can Tho to pay 790,000 Dong ($50), and those in other areas to pay 710,000 ($45).'

The new minimum salaries replace the previous minimums of 626,000, 556,000 and 480,000 Dong respectively, with the biggest percentage rise, of 48 per cent, going to more poorly paid workers in small cities and semi-rural areas.

This government decision had come about due to a demand for a minimum 40 per cent increase by the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL), the country's peak trade union body.

The reason for this wave of strikes was that many foreign investors asked the government to defer the wage rise until after the Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday, which began on 28 January 2006, because they 'couldn't afford' to pay the wage rise and also pay the Tet bonus. The Tet bonus is the equivalent of a thirteenth month salary that Vietnamese workers are legally entitled to. The government, thus, left it up to the bosses and workers to bargain over when it would be implemented before Tet.

Feeling they had waited long enough, workers downed tools with the full knowledge that they had the law, the open sympathy of most Vietnamese, the discreet sympathy of the government and the active support of the official trade union leadership on their side.

According to the 11 January 2006 Viet Nam News, the VGCL claimed 'the reason for recent strikes is that companies have announced wage policies and bonuses late'.

Thus the government did not announce a new policy to end the wave of strikes, but merely stated that its policy now had to be implemented no later than 1 February. Far from 'caving in' to the workers, the actual chain of events suggests that the government's wage rise decree last September set off the strikes, which aimed to see that the decree was enforced.

Foreign investors and the western media responded with hostility to the workers' struggles. The Economist quoted bosses claiming that 'outside agitators stoked the protests, distributing notes at factory gates while police stood idly by', and noted that 'some observers find it implausible that they could occur without the prior knowledge of the ruling party, which forbids independent trade unions. As in China, workers are allowed to join only a pliant, party-affiliated union.'

But this discourse about 'a pliant, party-affiliated union' looks rather ironic, considering the Economist complained about the strike action and accused the government and its 'pliant' union of being behind the strikes.

This irony is capped when the Economist went on to ask 'why didn't Vietnam crush the illegal strikes?' The Christian Science Monitor also noted that 'some observers were surprised by the failure of authorities to suppress the strikes - police on the scene stood by idly.'

The European Chamber of Commerce wrote to the prime minister, Phan Van Khai, to warn him that investors will set up shop in Vietnam because, they imagined, 'the workforce is not prone to industrial action', that is they wanted pliant workers and plaint unions.

Yet in reality, the reason the Vietnamese government did not do the bidding of these investors and 'crush' the strikes is because it does not usually do so. As the US Department of Commerce noted, although most strikes were led by spontaneous workers' groups rather than official unions, and though most 'did not follow proper legal procedures, they were tolerated by the government with no reports of retribution against the strikers' (Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Determination of Market Economy Status, November 2002).

It is common for the official Communist-led unions to step in and force bosses to relent to workers' demands. In one example, during a similar wave of strikes last October-November, the 1000 workers who struck at the Hong Kong-owned Rieker Viet Nam footwear factory only returned to work 'after a meeting between company's management and the provincial authorities and [the] Quang Nam Labour Federation on Thursday morning, the company's management agreed to a worker pay raise, better lunch and better working conditions', that is, to the strikers' precise demands.

The VGCL and its campaigning newspaper Lao Dong continually give support to strikes, even though they rarely organize them. Many plants employing rural migrants do not yet have union chapters, because migrants initially want to keep out of trouble; however, once they discover the nature of the exploitation and launch 'wild-cat' strikes, the VGCL then helps them win their demands and they subsequently sign up as union members. While virtually 'every strike' to date has not followed the lengthy procedures of the Labour Law, the VGCL also claims that 'every one' has been justified.

As the Economist Intelligence Unit has claimed, 'labour rights sentiments are backed by a conciliation system and a judiciary sympathetic to labour demands' (Risk Wire, Vietnam risk: Alert: Labor Reform, April 2, 2002). Likewise, investors complain that Vietnam's law protects employees more than employers, and according to the manager of Nike Vietnam, when workers go on strike unlawfully, officials support them (VDC Business Newsletter, December 21 2004).

Moreover, when the fact the government unwittingly set off the wave of strikes by decreeing the increases is combined with the openly supportive attitude of the VGCL and the extraordinary degree of apparent coordination among the strikers, the intriguing idea arises that VGCL activists may have had something, unofficially, to do with the strikes.

In other words, the ways in which the Communist Party and the various mass organisations it leads, such as the VGCL, navigate unsteadily between socialism and capitalism may encompass much more behind-the-scenes movement than the overly economic-pragmatist face it feels compelled to show the world.

As always, Vietnam will do things its own way, and the success rate of 'that way' remains high.

WATCHPOINT: Will the VGCL emerge as a more independent social actor as workers' traditional benefits and certainties are threatened in the near future by the combination of increased 'equitisation' of state enterprises and further trade liberation with WTO membership?

Michael Karadjis
Department of Political and Social Change,
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Australian National University
Canberra
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