反支那大聯盟

愛國謊言

林思雲

中國人的喜歡作假，已經有相當歷史了。近代以來，中國人又把作假提高到愛國的高度，搞出許多「愛國謊言」。

以說假話來體現「愛國感情」的方式，也許是中國人的首創。比如中國人看見日本兵殺了一個中國人，如果他如實說日本兵殺了1個中國人，就讓人覺得他的愛國感情不深、報國熱情不夠。要體現愛國情操，就要誇大日本兵的殺人人數。誰把日本兵的殺人人數說得越多，就表示誰對日本人越痛恨，就表示誰的愛國情操越深厚。

當1946年國民政府開始調查南京大屠殺人數的時候，中國人的愛國情操就充分體現出來了。大家開始競賽，看誰的愛國熱情高。於是，日本兵的殺人人數越說越多。謊撒到最後，竟有一個人聲稱他一個人看見日本兵殺了57,818人；有兩個人聲稱單單他們兩人就埋了28,730具屍體。這種說法誰都明白是胡說。可是就沒有人敢站出來說他們是胡說。因為，誰說中國證人撒謊，誰就是替日本人說話的漢奸，而漢奸在當時就是殺頭之罪。所以儘管大家都知道這是假的，但也沒有一個人敢說。於是「一個人看見日本兵殺了57,818人，兩個人埋了28,730具屍體」的荒唐事，居然也堂而皇之地登上了中國的各大報紙。

更為糟糕的是，這3個撒大謊者絲毫不知道外國的行情，以為外國和中國一樣也是謊言世界。於是，該3人堅決要求到國際法庭上去作證。雖然當時不少中國官員也知道這3人是在說謊，也知道讓他們去國際法庭會出醜，但誰也不敢不讓他們去。因為，誰阻止他們的愛國行為，誰就是漢奸。大家只好眼睜睜地看著這些撒大謊者，到國際法庭上給中國人出醜丟臉。當然，撒大謊者在國際法庭上給中國人出醜丟臉後，也沒有人敢指責他們的說謊行為。因為，他們說的是「愛國謊言」，大家只好以不再提起這幾個人的方式，來寬恕他們的「謊言誤國」行為。

當時國民政府從南京老百姓那裡調查得來的南京大屠殺人數，竟高達數百萬人。大概是因為日本兵的暴行激發了南京市民的愛國心，馬路東邊的人說，「日本兵在我們這裡殺了幾千人」，馬路西邊的人就說，「日本兵在我們這裡殺了幾萬人」。搞得國民政府也無所適從，根本搞不清誰講的是真話、誰講的是假話，最後只好拍腦袋決定：30萬人大致不太離譜，於是就有了南京大屠殺30萬人的數字。不過30萬這個已經大大「縮水」的南京大屠殺被害人數，還是讓國際法庭打回來，被壓縮到20萬或10萬人。

中國人以說假話來體現「愛國感情」的方式，也許是中國人的一種獨特的愛國方式。中國的每一次群眾性運動都是「謊言報國」的愛國運動。大躍進時，大家又開始以說謊的方式來競爭誰的共產主義思想水平高。你說糧食畝產千斤，他就說糧食畝產萬斤，思想更先進的又說糧食畝產10萬斤。其實糧食畝產10萬斤的胡言全國有幾個人真相信？可誰也不敢說糧食畝產10萬斤是謊言。誰敢批評這種「愛國謊言」就要被扣上反對社會主義的帽子、接受勞動改造。大家只好眼睜睜地看著這些彌天大謊登到中國的各大報紙上，成為世界級的笑料。「愛國謊言」造成幾千萬人餓死後，也沒有人敢指責那些信口糧食畝產萬斤的人，應該為餓死人負責。大家還是以不再提起「糧食畝產萬斤」的方式，來寬恕他們的「謊言誤國」行為。

在史無前例的文化大革命中，中國老百姓又把「謊言報國」發揮得淋漓盡致。為了揭露走資派劉少奇的罪行，人們揭發劉少奇的材料就有幾百噸重﹕真可謂罄竹難書，什麼罪行都有！然而，後來劉少奇平反時，也沒有人由於誣告劉少奇而獲罪。因為，這畢竟是「愛國謊言」。大家還是以不再提起那些告黑狀人們的方式，來寬恕他們的「謊言誤國」行為。

1989年民運，又給了中國老百姓一次「謊言報國」的大好機會。為了表示對中共屠城的憤慨，大家都爭相說天安門廣場血流成河。當時如果有人站出來說他只看見打死幾個人或幾十個人，一定會被憤怒的愛國者們斥為中共的走狗。在外國人拍的電視上，我們首次親眼看到一位「謊言報國」者公開聲稱天安門打死幾萬人，似乎不這樣說就無法表示他對共產黨屠殺行為之憤恨。該人因說謊而下獄時，人們還都對他持同情的態度。因為，那畢竟是「愛國謊言」。在中國人的心目中，因為愛國而說謊，甚至被認為是一種美德。

如果你去中國的老百姓中間調查南京大屠殺、三年大饑荒、文革、「6．4」慘案等的確切被害人數，你只會得到一個被大大誇張了的「愛國數字」，永遠不會得到真實的數字。因為，中國老百姓的「愛」和「恨」，都是用說謊的形式來表達的。為了愛祖國，我們就要用謊言把中國說成好得不得了；為了恨敵人，我們又要用謊言把敵人說成壞得不得了。「愛」越深，「謊」就越大；「恨」越深，「謊」也越大。

「愛國謊言」是中國文化的一個禁區。誰要敢捅開「愛國謊言」的禁區，誰就要成為「人民的公敵」。比如南京大屠殺的被害人數有30萬，許多中國人自己心中也半信半疑，可就是不敢說出口來。當然，如果有人說南京大屠殺的人數有40萬，肯定不會有人責怪他說謊。可是如果有人敢說南京大屠殺被殺人數沒有30萬，他一定會被群起攻之，被斥為賣主求榮的漢奸，甚至斥為不是中國人。難道要做中國人就必須說謊？不說謊的人就不是中國人？

每次「謊言報國」的群眾運動以後，中國就要為這些「愛國謊言」付出沈重的代價。南京大屠殺的愛國謊言使日本有了不向中國道歉的理由；大躍進的愛國謊言使中國餓死了幾千萬老百姓，其中大概也包括不少大說「愛國謊言」的撒謊者；文化大革命的愛國謊言使中國成為不說謊就無法生存的謊言世界；「6．4」的愛國謊言把好端端的民主運動搞成現在這個樣子。今後中國再來一次「謊言報國」的群眾運動，中國就還要為此付出更沈重的代價。

我真盼望中國以後不再出現「謊言報國」的群眾運動、盼望中國的老百姓不再用說謊的方式來表示愛國的熱情、盼望有勇敢的人捅開「愛國謊言」的禁區。

   1. 何以許多支那人藉出國旅遊的時候,跳機逃離支那,或千方百計花許多錢,冒死偷渡到外國去打工,這是為什麼?

   2. 支那人為什麼會有1億人患有乙肝帶原?

   3. 為什麼支那的肺結核病人高達600萬人,曾經感染的支那人有4億人之多?

   4. 支那人為什麼有2億文盲及乞丐?

   5.支那的貧困農民為什麼佔總人口80%以上?

   6.支那的大學生為什麼如此之少,只有3%左右?

   7.世界各國小學教育都是義務性的,而支那的許多小學生為什麼還要繳交高額贊助費(幾千~幾萬人民幣)?

   8.支那的失業人口為什麼如此之多(8%以上)?

   9.支那的發票稅為什麼高達17%,而台灣只有5%?

   10.支那買汽車為什麼還要審批通過才能買?
 
   除了17%的加值稅之外,還要收車價的10%的附加稅?

   11.支那為什麼每年公款吃喝要花掉約2,000億人民幣?

   12.支那共產黨高幹為什麼每年要侵吞公款約6,000億?

   13.支那共產黨何以要隱瞞SARS病情5個月之久, 北京第一天公佈的感染人數,為什麼比第二天公佈的人數相差10倍?為什麼支那駐泰國外交官欺騙泰國人說支那的SARS已經受控制,可以放心到支那經商觀光?

   14.支那人均收入每年只有810美元,但看病貴,吃飯穿衣都貴,為什麼這樣過了52年仍不知悔改?

   15.支那外債高達1,700億美元,老百姓大都苦哈哈,但何以還要大把花錢向俄羅斯購買武器?國防軍費每年為什麼要高達200~600億美元?

   16蘇聯極力要脫離聯邦制,好不容易將十幾個聯邦分離出去,相反的為什麼中共卻莫名其妙的要不放棄武力侵犯的[統一]?

   17.推翻滿清的是中華民國,打倒日本的是中華民國,因此!所謂[中華民國]明明仍然存在,何以支那卻口口聲聲說中華民國已經被消滅,而共產黨代表支那?支那為什麼要欺騙大家?

   18.支那的國父明明是孫中山先生,為什麼支那共產黨只說孫先生是革命先行者?

   19.1912年推翻滿清建國的中華民國明明是支那之父,為什麼1949年真正叛亂集團的支那共產黨卻反過頭來欺騙人民說,中華民國是叛亂集團?
 
   20.支那共產黨的貪污明明十分嚴重,但是每年被肅貪的貪官何以那麼少?

   21.為什麼解放軍號稱是世界十大軍事強國之一,但薪水卻是排名世界100名以外?

   22.為什麼解放軍將領個個是富豪?但士兵卻個個苦哈哈? (不像台灣,士兵比將軍有錢的多得是!)

   23.為什麼解放軍老是替暴政去送死?韓戰及越戰,與印度的戰爭都死了那麼多人?

   24.為什麼韓戰時幫北韓打南韓,用肉体去擋美國大兵的先進武器?

   25.為什麼越戰時扶助越共,但日後卻又被越共修理?

   26.為什麼解放軍連外蒙都解放不了,卻任憑俄羅斯予取予求幫助外蒙分裂出去?
 
   27.為什麼解放軍連釣魚台都不敢上去?卻叫嚷釣魚台是支那的?

   28.為什麼解放軍連被俄羅斯強佔的[海參威港]都要不回來?卻仍卑躬屈膝的 向俄羅斯買武器?

   29.為什麼解放軍要在天安門前殘殺自己的同胞?明明是手無寸鐵的文弱書生, 卻使用大坦克來壓,用機槍來掃射?難道不能用逮捕或強力水柱或催淚彈仁道驅離自己的國民呢?
 
   30.為什麼解放軍一面不准台灣國買美國的武器,自己卻大買俄羅斯的武器?

   31.為什麼支那杯葛台灣加入WHO,支那的衛生部長52年來明明沒有到過台灣卻 又寡廉鮮恥,大言不慚的說台灣2300萬人民的健康是靠支那?

   32.為什麼支那杯葛台灣加入聯合國,杯葛台灣總統參與APEC會議?支那憑甚麼那麼霸道,那麼蠻橫?

   33.為什麼支那害怕台灣總統及高官到世界各國去訪問?還說甚麼台灣風雨飄搖,沒有朋友?

   34.為什麼支那外交部每與一國建交,就要該國不得承認台灣政府?處處打擊台灣政府還假惺惺說要兩岸和平?

   35.為什麼台灣明明還有邦交國,支那卻欺騙支那人,宣稱台灣在國際上沒有國家承認?

   36.為什麼支那的許多工人明明是靠台商養活,但是卻又調侃台商說台商靠大陸撈錢,明明是雙方互利,卻說成台商靠支那?

   37.為什麼共產黨說支那不是共產主義國家,而改稱為[有支那特色的社會主義]?如果是這樣,何以不甘脆將[支那共產黨]改名叫[支那社會黨]?

   38.為什麼俄羅斯佔領支那的庫頁島,海參威及西伯利亞大片土地,支那卻從來不敢叫囂要俄羅斯歸還這些土地?

   39.為什麼支那的高幹都靠走後門及裙帶關係,吃香的喝辣的,無憂無慮享受豪華生活,卻不顧貧困的其中1億農民三餐不得溫飽的事實?

   40.為什麼支那許多高幹子女可以免費出國留學深造,而真正優秀的學生之公費留學名額卻少得可憐這種抹煞人才的做法對國家根本不利,何以仍不改善?
 
   41.為什麼美國幫支那打敗日本,免於支那當亡國奴,況且美國沒有佔領過任何 支那的土地,現在又向支那買那麼多產品,你們賺取美國那麼多外匯,你們卻如 此仇美,反觀俄羅斯強佔支那那麼多土地,又很少買支那產品,他們還賣武器給你們賺你們的錢,你們卻反而親俄?

   42.為什麼印尼那麼排華,欺負華僑,你們政府卻反而無息貸款4億美元給印尼, 你們像哈巴狗一樣舔印尼人的屁眼,難道不嫌臭嗎?

   43.為什麼你們公廁那麼髒,現代化的衛生私人廁所卻那麼少?你們難道不怕蒼蠅孳生傳播病媒嗎?

   44.為什麼你們火車的廁所都沒有加底,直接讓屎尿遍洒在鐵軌上?難怪傳染性疾病這麼多,你們真的不害怕嗎?

   45.為什麼支那的墮胎那麼頻繁,而且因墮胎喪生的人民每年都有7萬多人呢?為什麼不好好教育人民避孕常識,好好教育人民要負起責任小心呢?

   46.為什麼支那妓女那麼多,性病那麼猖獗,為什麼不好好規範妓女的健康狀況由衛生局來監督檢驗呢?

   47.支那人口多是因為以前毛澤東鼓勵多生,現在終於吃足苦頭才要後悔,毛澤東在文化大革命時明明殘殺許多無辜 ,可是為什麼沒有人敢於批評?如今RMB的封面還擺放其人像,實在不可思議!

   48.為什麼沿海與內陸貧富如此懸殊,內陸建設如此落後?

   49.為什麼公款吃喝有錢,學校建設沒錢,然後有錢借印尼,自己卻向國際間募款 要蓋學校,美其名叫希望工程,這不是極端諷刺嗎?

   50.為什麼上海市浦東區,許多的高樓都是日本人蓋的?你們口口聲聲日本鬼子, 但是一想到有錢借,就又有奶便是娘的與日本親熱起來?

51.為什麼承認日本國旗,讓日本國旗飄揚在支那,甚至於連日本的工廠都能設在南京?難道你們忘了南京大屠殺中日本曾經屠殺30萬南京人嗎?難道支那人已經忘掉這個國恥?忘掉日本軍官砍人頭比賽,強姦支那女人後將刺刀刺進女人陰道的奇恥大辱?支那男人無法保護支那女人,支那男人還是男人嗎?

   52.為什麼矮化中華民國?要知道中華民國還是抗日主力,沒有國軍與日本的正面交鋒,牽制日本的部隊,支那早就淪為日本亡奴了,可是共產黨卻利用國軍與日本作戰,傷亡慘重的空隙奪取政權,然而篡改歷史說抗日是共產黨的功勞?如此不要臉的行為,你們顏面有何光彩?

   53.為什麼對日本佔領釣魚台一事像縮頭烏龜一般?任憑日本軍艦巡弋支那海疆卻只敢做做樣子,安慰自己說釣魚台仍屬支那?

   54.當64天安門事件爆發大屠殺事件後,為什麼說謊欺騙人民說沒有死一位學生?並且誣陷學生殺害解放軍,這種指鹿為馬,篡改史實的行為是國家應有的國格嗎?

   55.為什麼誣蔑法輪功為邪教組織,並不斷迫害學員?明明是正統練習氣功的民間團體,只因李洪志的聲勢驚人怕難以駕馭,竟然殃及池魚把學員加以禁制及殘害?

   56.為什麼支那要迫害西藏,當初用十萬軍隊殘殺9000民兵,軟禁斑禪喇嘛,迫害達賴喇嘛妄圖以逼迫精神領袖之法來威嚇藏民,造成藏民死傷逃難出國只達120萬人之眾!

   57.為什麼支那的特權如此猖狂,許多高幹的第二代明明是阿斗也都身居要職?

   58.為什麼北京人瞧不起東北人,上海人瞧不起外地人,沿海瞧不起內地,南方人瞧不起北方人,可是共產黨卻編派謊言說,支那支那已經56族共和?

   59.為什麼支那的儲蓄率那麼高,銀行卻有那麼多的爛帳,許多貸款回收無著,萬一人民擠兌,豈不是要鬧金融風暴嗎?

   60.為什麼道路收費站那麼多,收費又那麼高,有些地方的道路都已經破破爛爛的了居然還好意思收費,這些錢又用到那些建設卻也不見公告?

   61.為什麼害怕民主,難道不信任支那人民的能力嗎?如果真的不信任人民的能力,那麼表示支那人民很差,既然很差!何以又吹噓支那有前途,難道很差的人民可以建立很強的國家嗎?

   62.為什麼讓朱鎔基下台,他做得比許多高幹都還要好,是不是因為怕他肅貪時會拔掉許多老虎的鬍鬚]此心虛先把他幹掉,好讓太子黨們繼續恣情吸金?

   63.為什麼江澤民沒有辭去軍委主席之職,按年資他已經太老了,難道支那人不怕鄧小平因為太老而做出錯誤的天安門屠殺的老糊塗之舉又重演嗎?

   64.為什麼支那培養不出科學的諾貝爾獎得主,只有零星的文學諾貝爾得主?人口那麼少的台灣反而能夠培養出像李遠哲這樣的理化界優秀的諾貝爾得主?

   65.台灣人被支那拋棄不要,被荷蘭佔領長達38年,被日本殖民長達50年,若不是美國的幫助打敗了日本,如今台灣人還在日本奴役之下,何以支那今天還臉說甚麼祖國呀,母親呀一類肉麻稀稀的話,不怕台灣人雞皮疙瘩會掉一地嗎?

   66.支那老百姓有許多人生病了根本不敢看醫生,原因是平均看一次病要45元, 住一次院要1826元,有許多貧農一年的收入也就2000元左右,那能經得起看病呢?而這種困境之下,為什麼共產黨不想想辦法改善呢?難怪支那會有這些順口溜:「小康、小康，一場大病全泡湯」、「救護車一響，一頭豬白養」!

   67.支那的新聞媒体都要經過控制,一言堂的社會,都只是報喜不報憂,其實支那兇殺案與竊盜案之多是相當可怕的,到處是土匪路霸,難道支那沒有勇氣去面對問題進一步解決問題嗎?

   68.支那毒品氾濫成災,許多[迪士可舞廳]年輕人流連忘返,如此下去人民体能與身心健康必然有問題,以後如何教育良好的下一代?

   69.支那假酒氾濫,喝死很多人,也到處販賣假煙,還有許多名牌仿冒,甚至於盜版音樂光碟與電腦軟体光碟都四處流通,是否支那立志成為盜版之國呢?

   70.三峽大壩其實存在有一定風險,但是為什麼支那中央卻貪圖龐大的發電利而忽略了其風險,萬一大壩坍塌,會有多少人慘遭淹沒呢,一意孤行掌權者心中有沒有人民呢?另外大霸也會淹沒許多三國時代的古蹟,可是支那仍然是一意孤行,支那心中有祖先的觀念嗎?

   71.支那的國營企業虧損累累,貪污舞弊也十分嚴重,有許多國營事業,其實是賺錢的,但是到了年終損益分析報到中央時卻又虧本,這是為什麼呢?賺的錢到底到誰的口袋裡去了呢?

   72.支那人口那麼多,為什麼流行歌壇都是台灣及香港的天下呢?難道支那人都沒有音樂細胞嗎?

   73.支那人口13億,但是每次奧運會的金牌數都比不過美國與俄羅斯,這是為什麼呢?

   74.日本土地面積僅為377,708平方公里,人口1.46億,比支那9,600,000平方公里人口13億要小上許多,資源也比支那貧乏,但是日本的全國總產值高達4萬5千億美元,為什麼支那的總產值卻只有1萬億美元,僅為日本的22%呢?

   75.支那窮兵黷武培養北韓欲對抗東北亞,培養巴基斯坦欲對抗西南角,與俄羅斯的北方邊境卻與之簽訂這樣的內容:即支那退兵500公里,但是俄羅斯為什麼卻只需退兵100公里?看這不平等協議就知道支那的無能。

   76.支那號稱為社會主義國家,但是土地是黨國的,公房也已經取消,四金保險也慢慢變質,人民負擔日漸加重,這根本不是社會主義為什麼還要欺騙老百姓?

   77.支那國營機關對老百姓的服務態度普遍不佳,但是你們為什麼老喜歡說:[為人民服務]呢?應該說:[為人民幣服務]吧?

   78.2002年臺灣的經濟成長率仍達3.54%,比美國的2.4%,新加坡的2.3%,香港的2.2%,日本的0.4%都還要高,但是為什麼支那的媒体老是要唱衰台灣?

   79.李登輝總統與阿扁總統政權的和平交替,明明是亞洲國家的典範,連支那都應該學習的,為什麼支那不能虛心學習這麼好的民主制度?讓阿扁總統的良好示範帶領支那邁向民主佳境?

   80.支那明明是東協大國,支那為什麼無顏派人參加東協領袖SARS高峰會?

   81.為什麼支那支那每年會有兩百萬人自殺未遂?如果支那真的如他們講得那麼充滿期待,有那麼美麗的願景,何以那麼多支那人要輕生?

   82.為什麼支那的愛滋病毒感染者增加為80萬,比2000年增加至少40%。WHO警告,若不迅速採取有效的預防措施,支那到2010年將有1000萬人受到感染。支那有能力防止愛滋的擴散嗎?

   83.奧地利主辦了第1屆的奧林匹克合唱大賽,台灣有幾個團參加比賽,包括幾個兒童合唱團,很多家庭主婦,媽媽帶著小孩出國比賽。這些人跟政治一點關係都沒有,公共生活的經驗可能也不是很豐富,可是，他們卻親眼目睹台灣在支那的政治壓力下所遭受的種種不公平待遇,包括被禁止參與開幕與閉幕進場儀式,被禁止拿國旗和懸掛中華台北會旗,很多媽媽和小孩當場都氣哭了,為什麼支那人那麼令人感到嫌惡?

   84.台灣年輕人對支那的感情已經夠疏離了,這些台灣新一代的年輕人連國民黨都不喜歡了,怎麼會喜歡比國民黨還壞的共產黨?為什麼支那人會那麼無知的要台灣新世代去接受毫無交集的認知呢?更何況支那的飛彈恐嚇威脅仍持續進行著!誰會去喜歡土匪?

   85.阿扁總統被台灣寄予帶領台灣走出黑金政治的希望,台灣的新世代年輕人才不管什麼統獨,上一代的人對支那有國仇家恨,關我們台灣什麼事?為什麼溫家寶、陳雲林一群老把「一個支那」掛在嘴邊的人,和橫眉豎目經常在記者會上罵台灣的李肇腥老是在電視上威脅台灣人不要支持陳水扁,正好對照出支那的惡霸嘴臉,坐實了支那的可惡本質。

   86.當9.11事件發生後,全球一致譴責恐怖份子,連美國的宿敵伊朗也為這次美國死難者開悼念會,譴責恐怖分子,為什麼支那一群記者及大學生會拍手倖災樂禍呢?支那支那人的同情心到哪裡去了?支那支那人的同情心,教養等,難道還比不上伊朗?

   87.在港英政府時期,香港也經歷過無數次經濟危機,但都是有驚無險,而且經濟越來越好,為什麼香港回到支那懷抱才五個年頭,香港就表現出沒希望了呢?其實是「回歸支那」造成了香港的「工業空洞化」、「資金空洞化」及「人才空洞化」!香港「三空化」以後,接下來台灣若不與支那撇清關係,那麼台灣也會成「三空化」!。因為支那人就是這樣,自己不好,也不希望別人好,甚至寧願自己不好,也決不讓你好,就是那種小鼻子,小眼睛的「紅眼病」心態。

   88.支那四大銀行壞帳有多少?上市公司是如何做會計的?支那國民的收入到底有多少﹙這一數據直接與預測消費力有關﹚?人們永遠沒有正確數字。看香港97後資金被支那「掏空」,面對嚴峻的局面,香港當局也都束手無策,為什麼支那用了愚蠢的「殺雞取卵」的方法,只顧了一時的「淺層繁榮」,最後終於失去了香港長期為支那「生金蛋」的功能?

   89.為什麼港英時期留下的約七千億港幣的資產,到現在僅餘下三千多億?按理說四千億港幣應該可以使香港更加繁榮呀?但是我們反而看到今日蕭條的香港,何也?

   90.上海在用盡方法吸引外資的同時,各種負面作用也在不知不覺中孳生,它們將對上海的長期發展起破壞作用,,上海事實上已經墮入惡境,外資企業已經佔 據了上海國內總產值的百分之六十以上,上海進出口的百分之六十以上也都倚賴外資企業,情況明明越來越嚴重,外資已經操控了上海的經濟命脈,而為什麼支那卻仍一派樂觀的看好上海?如果不是外行怎會如此樂觀?

   91.上海本地人把在南京路的消費者稱之為「阿模林」﹙傻瓜﹚。上海人將他的「捉阿模林」﹙騙傻瓜﹚的本領發揮的淋漓盡致,不少香港人都大上其 當,血本無歸。有些臺商在上海認為是在掏金,其實哭的日子還在後頭,現在已有不少先期的臺灣人在上海投資失敗了,轉過頭來再騙其他臺灣人的現象,為什麼面對這種陷阱,支那人仍笑而不答,裝做不知呢?顯然這又是支那人甕中捉鱉的一貫技倆了!

   92.在大前年聖誕節正式開張的上海超級Shopping mall 港匯廣場,聳立在上海最熱鬧的百貨公司一級戰區徐家匯。臺商到港匯廣場用餐,都會被洶涌的人潮所震撼,但是,面積相當于四個臺北Sogo的港匯廣場,除了少數餐廳之外,整個賣 場門可羅雀,賣的全部是「類似名牌」的次級貨,這個案子牢牢套住,香港恆隆集團七億美元的資金。外表光彩炫麗的港匯廣場,恐怕會讓恆隆集團血本無歸。港匯廣場是所謂『不切實際的支那夢』的最佳警世碑,上海所見林立光 鮮大樓的幕后,有太多股東血淚交織人間悲劇,為什麼還是有那麼多無知的人夢想著到支那築夢,最終恐怕還是惡夢一場吧?

   93.最近首次看到一個真實數字,這是支那財政部的調查資料,該調查資料顯示,高達98.7%的公司在年度報告中虛報盈利。華盛頓郵報在一篇專文中說,投資基金,上市公司主管,會計師及財經工商記者已形成幕後操縱股市的共犯結構,其中最大的受害者當屬散戶。支那股市層出不窮的黑幕深藏者一個共犯結構－投資基金相互勾結藉此抬高或拉下股價；公司主管利用關於公司策略的相關機密資訊牟取私利；會計師在虛假公司財務報表上蓋章；財經工商記者為了得到熱門股或者「紅包」,大肆吹捧那些毫無價值的公司。 從支那網易公司被美國納斯達克停牌看來,支那公司不僅在國內誇大公司業績,以財務欺騙為時尚,還將這種欺騙行為用到國際上去。原以為外國人也不過如此,做生意不就是你騙我,我騙你嗎?他們萬萬沒想到美國的股市監管是對中小投資者利益加以保護的,股市是為了讓有前途的,受歡迎的公司在該市場上得到集資的機會,欺騙大眾是要受到法律制裁的。為什麼支那企業不知道靠虛假只能騙得一時,被戳穿後的代價不菲嗎?

   94.勸告對支那市場充滿幻想的人們,當看到支那官方發表的統計數字,就以為支那正大步邁向復甦之路的人,不妨聽聽「千萬北姑賣春去,失業大軍正發難」的民間順口溜；被上海超高大樓迷惑的臺商,千萬不要忽略上海已經有三千多棟超高大樓這個「供過於求」的事實,走在人潮洶涌的百貨公司,請暗地算算到底有多少人手中提著購物袋?至于看到超大餐廳人滿為患的景象,千萬不要妄下『在支那做吃的一定賺錢』的結論,多花點時間上街逛逛,算算有多少門可羅雀的餐廳再做決定吧。否則當你血本無歸時才問:為什麼沒有人告訴我?這時候已經太遲了。

   95.為什麼沒有人提醒你:「支那證券市場成立的目的,是共產黨為了解決國有企業的困境而設置的,其所吸收的資金,幾乎都給了經營不善的國營企業」「在美國、日本甚至臺灣這樣的經濟體,經營績效越好的公司,越能從證券市場取得擴張所需要的資金」可是,支那的股市只是為了挽救瀕臨崩潰的國營企業才開放,把危機轉嫁給大眾的方法？

   96.我曾在廣州及上海的大街上看到有人公開兜售假文憑,在加拿大見到一些自稱博士和大學教授的支那新移民英語差到不像話。網路上有新移民呼籲新移民不要再用假文憑、假學歷、假履歷去應聘了。該呼籲者說,有相當多的支那新移民用不實履歷應聘進了當地高科技公司,但是很快就遭辭退,他們的就職平均「壽命」不到一個月。問題還不只是造假者個人再也無信用,不少大公司看到應聘書若是支那支那來的,乾脆連看也不看,連累了個別真才實料的支那新移民。如果你在支那招聘遇到拿大學文憑的人不會操作Office軟体, 請不要問我為什麼?因為你應該猜得到,沒錯!他用的是假文憑。支那人雖然可以原諒和容忍自己的無知,但是世界卻不能容忍這種現象的泛濫。

   97.支那刑法制度是先定下某人的罪名,然後再羅列罪證,與支那的刑法制度相似,支那也習慣先定下各種經濟指標,然後再通過努力或會計方式來落實事先定下的數字。所以,相信今年以及今後五年,支那經濟增長出現的數據最少是7%。請不要問我為什麼,因為只要支那願意,他也可以宣稱成長為12%!這就是支那。

   98.文革時支那人表現出的冷血、瘋狂,在支那歷史上是找不到的。同樣,今天 支那所出現的「一切朝錢看」,不少人為了錢所表現出的無法無天,也是毛時代看不到的。在毛時代初期,人們熱中於「五講四美」、學雷峰做好事, 誰知道毛後期的支那人相互鬥爭,個個變得六親不認。事實證明,世上並沒有一個一層不變的所謂「民族性」,至少可以這麼說,「民族性」只是一個短時 期的民族表現,長期看是「可塑的」是會變的。提倡「民族性」的人,無非是為了表現自身民族的優秀或高人一等而已。但實際上呢？最卑賤無恥的就是支那民族了。

   99.支那幾年前一直在叫:「科教興國」喊了半天,似乎若有其事,但是看看 其2001年的財政預算中的教育經費竟然只有26.78億美元,只約佔財政總支出的2%時,我們就心理有數了,這根本不是在辦教育!香港只有700萬不到的人口, 如果連香港的教育預算都可以編列56.4億美元超過支那兩倍時,而當支那的軍 事預算為什麼可以超高編至600億美元時,我們知道支那的「科教興國」竟然只是口號而已?

   100.台灣的經濟並不很差,比較一下就知道了。目前美國的失業率為4.5%,日本 是4.7%,香港是4.6%,加拿大為７％,西歐平均為6.4%,而台灣僅為3.8%,怎麼談得上「經濟危機」呢?

被抓到靖廬，吃穿無慮，反而是大陸女子最快樂的天堂。

至於大陸女子來台人數，根據目前拘押在新竹、宜蘭兩地的收容中心人數600餘人計，流落在外的人數起碼在10倍以上，也就是說約在6,000～7,000人。 ＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊ 大陸妹守護神賴文福 報導／劉建宏 「醫生，我昨天做了10個客人，一邊做，肚子又很痛，待會兒吊完點滴，可不可以再做？」 「不行，妳都已經發炎、流濃，今天一定要休息，明天早上再來檢查，如果肚子不痛了，再讓妳上班。」 長髮披肩的大陸妹，長相秀麗，今年才20歲。她說，來到台灣已經快1個月了，當初欠下偷渡蛇頭的費用也快還完了，所以，她趕著要上班，希望早日還完錢，才能開始賺錢。 幫她看病的則是台中市賴婦產科院長賴文福，由於長期醫治來台賣淫的大陸妹，得到大陸妹和應召站老闆的信任，賴文福也因此贏得了「大陸妹的守護神」之譽。

向支那說NO！向台灣說YES！

我曾經在的那家大型仲介公司，主要以移民業務為主。

我雖然負責留學業務，但也接觸了很多辦理移民的支那人。

這些人分幾類：

1、技術移民：一些學了一知半解技能的青年人，羡慕國外的物質生活，移民成功了仍然愛國，在國外當民工。

Who Lost China's Internet?
From the February 25, 2002 issue: Without U.S. assistance, it will remain a tool of the Beijing government, not a force for democracy.
by Ethan Gutmann
02/15/2002 12:00:00 AM
 
BEIJING
It's not easy being the father of the Chinese Internet. Children are running by, boats are paddling, the smell of roast lamb fills the air, and Michael Robinson, a young American computer engineer, sits rigidly, facing an empty cafe on the shore of Qinghai Lake, speaking in a low voice of the crackdown. "What is better? Big brother Internet? Or no Internet at all?" Michael asks.

Michael was hired in 1996 by the Chinese government and Global One (a Sprint-France Telecom-Deutsche Telekom joint venture) to build the first network in China providing public access to the Internet. One day sticks in his mind. The Chinese engineers working with him suddenly convened a special meeting, demanding to know if it would be possible to do keyword searching inside e-mails and web addresses on the Chinese Internet. Not really, Michael replied; all information that travels the Net is broken up into little packets. It's hard to "sniff" packets of information, particularly coded packets. You would need to intercept packets as they travel, and then there's the problem of collating the information they contain, actually making sense of it. Yes, yes, they said, but can you do it? On the third go-round, it dawned on Michael that his fellow computer geeks wanted to end the meeting, too. But at a higher level, someone required assurance. Before Internet construction proceeded further, they would need to monitor what Chinese users did with it. For the engineers, this was just cover-your-ass stuff. As long as the foreigner
 
assured them that down the road the Chinese would be able to build an Internet firewall against the world and conduct surveillance on its own citizens, the engineers could continue working with him. Yes, yes, it can be done, Michael told them, and they went back to work.

Americans make dreams, and every generation carries new ones to China. Since 1979 that dream has been the fall of the Chinese Communist party and the rise of the world's largest market, an event that U.S. businessmen and China hands keep predicting is on the horizon or even imminent. Yet Michael was not naive. He understood the self-serving nature of much of the democracy-is-just-around-the-corner rhetoric. Working inside, he sensed the Chinese leadership's true motives in building an Internet. One of his friends, Peter Lovelock, author of the "Made For China Internet Update," puts it this way: "These are Marxists. Control the means of communication; embrace the means of communication. Fill it with Chinese voices. If they can block the outside, and block relationships between Chinese forces, no one will listen."

But for Michael, any reservations over complicity with Chinese government objectives were outweighed by a bedrock faith in the Internet's ingenious architecture. A system created to relay U.S. command messages over a damaged network after sustaining a Soviet nuclear strike could surely find a way to get messages through, securely, amid the white noise of millions of Chinese users. Resistance would be futile--even the Chinese Borg could not stop it. With the genie of free speech out of the bottle, it would just be a matter of time before those predictions of democracy in China come true.

That vision has now been called into question, not by a failure of the Internet's architecture, but in several cases, by a failure of American corporate values. Let's start where Michael left off, with the expansion of the Chinese Internet. I treated a top Chinese engineer (who wishes to remain anonymous) to a 30-course imperial meal in Beijing. As hoped, the shark's fin soup loosened his tongue--on the subject of Cisco Systems. In the United States, Cisco is known (among other things) for building corporate firewalls to block viruses and hackers. In China, the government had a unique problem: how to keep a billion people from accessing politically sensitive websites, now and forever.

The way to do it would be this: If a Chinese user tried to view a website outside China with political content, such as CNN.com, the address would be recognized by a filter program that screens out forbidden sites. The request would then be thrown away, with the user receiving a banal message: "Operation timed out." Great, but China's leaders had a problem: The financial excitement of a wired China quickly led to a proliferation of eight major Internet service providers (ISPs) and four pipelines to the outside world. To force compliance with government objectives--to ensure that all pipes lead back to Rome--they needed the networking superpower, Cisco, to standardize the Chinese Internet and equip it with firewalls on a national scale. According to the Chinese engineer, Cisco came through, developing a router device, integrator, and firewall box specially designed
 
for the government's telecom monopoly. At approximately $20,000 a box, China Telecom "bought many thousands" and IBM arranged for the "high-end" financing. Michael confirms: "Cisco made a killing. They are everywhere."

Cisco does not deny its success in China. Nor does it deny that it may have altered its products to suit the special needs of the Chinese "market"--a localization scheme the company avoided elsewhere in the world--but it categorically rejects any responsibility for how the government uses its firewall boxes. David Zhou, a systems engineer manager at Cisco, Beijing, told me flat out, "We don't care about the [Chinese government's] rules. It's none of Cisco's business." I replied that he has a point: It's not the gun but the way it's used, and how can a company that builds firewalls be expected to, well, not build firewalls? Zhou relaxed, then confidently added that the capabilities of Cisco's routers can be used to intercept information and to conduct keyword searches: "We have the capability to look deeply into the packet." He admitted that Cisco is under the direct scrutiny of State Security, the Public Security Bureau, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Does Cisco allow the PLA to look into packets? Zhou didn't know or wouldn't say. But consider, for example, the arrest of veteran activist Chi Shouzhu last April. He was picked up in a crowded train station minutes after printing out online materials promoting Chinese democracy. Incidents such as this have mushroomed in China, suggesting that Cisco may not be the only one capable of looking deeply into the packets. In fact, Cisco's ability to thrive in China may well depend on cooperation with the Public Security Bureau and the PLA.

Cisco's firewall has proven to be far from foolproof. New sites on forbidden topics crop up daily, and with the proliferation of ISPs who just want more subscribers surfing, the lag time between updating the government's list of banned sites and implementation can be erratic. So Chinese security organs also needed to control the search engines through which new sites can be found.

Enter Yahoo! The business press has painted a picture of a thriving, home-grown Chinese market for portals and search engines--mirroring such companies as AOL, Google, and Excite--with names like Sohu, Netease, and Sina fighting for the top spots. Chinese Yahoo!, the American outrider, trails in fifth place. A top Yahoo! representative spoke to me on the condition that I would not use his name or give identifying details other than that he had recently left the company. He admitted that Yahoo! is actually the most popular portal in China by a mile. Management had fudged the hit rate, because "we were viewed as extremely aggressive. We were seen as too foreign."

Chinese xenophobia has led many other U.S. companies to play similar games, but Yahoo! was particularly eager to please. All Chinese chat rooms or discussion groups have a "big mama," a supervisor for a team of censors who wipe out politically incorrect comments in real time. Yahoo! handles things differently. If in the midst of a discussion you type, "We should have nationwide multiparty elections in China!!" no one else will react to your comment. How could they? It appears on your screen, but only you and Yahoo!'s big mama actually see your thought crime. After intercepting it and preventing its transmission, Mother Yahoo! then solicitously generates a friendly e-mail suggesting that you cool your rhetoric--censorship, but with a New Age nod to self-esteem.

The former Yahoo! rep also admitted that the search phrase "Taiwan independence" on Chinese Yahoo! would yield no results, because Yahoo! has disabled searches for select keywords, such as "Falun Gong" and "China democracy." Search for VIP Reference, a major overseas Chinese dissident site, and you will get a single hit, a government site ripping it to shreds. How did Yahoo! come up with these policies? He replied, "It was a precautionary measure. The State Information Bureau was in charge of watching and making sure that we complied. The game is to make sure that they don't complain." By this logic, when Yahoo! rejected an attempt by Voice of America to buy ad space, they were just helping the Internet function smoothly. The former rep defended such censorship: "We are not a content creator, just a medium, a selective medium." But it is a critical medium. The Chinese government uses it to wage political campaigns against Taiwan, Tibet, and America. And of course the great promise of the Internet in China was supposed to be that it was unfettered, not selective. The Yahoo! rep again: "You adjust. The crackdowns come in waves; it's just the issue du jour. It's normal."

But what is "normal" in China can be altered under duress. When Chinese authorities ordered Microsoft to surrender its software's underlying source codes--the keys to encryption--as the price of doing business there, Microsoft chose to fight, spearheading an unprecedented Beijing-based coalition of American, Japanese, and European Chambers of Commerce. Faced with being left behind technologically, the Chinese authorities dropped their demands. Theoretically, China's desire to be part of the Internet should have given the capitalists who wired it similar leverage. Instead, the leverage all seems to have remained with the government, as Western companies fell all over themselves bidding for its favor. AOL, Netscape Communications, and Sun Microsystems all helped disseminate government propaganda by backing the China Internet Corporation, an arm of the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Not to be outdone, Sparkice, a Canadian Internet colossus, splashily announced that it would serve up only state-sanctioned news on its website. Nortel provides software for voice and closed-circuit camera recognition--technology that the Public Security Bureau has already put to good use, according to the Chinese press. AOL is quietly weighing the pros and cons of informing on dissidents if the Public Security Bureau so requests; the right decision would clearly speed Chinese approval for AOL to offer Internet services and perhaps get a foothold in the Chinese television market. In fact, AOL signed a landmark deal with a Chinese station at the end of October. Smaller American companies and smaller nations smell the blood. Along with Chinese officials, they dominate Chinese Internet-security trade shows. China Telecom is considering purchasing software from iCognito, an Israeli company that invented a program called "artificial content recognition," which surfs along just ahead of you, learning as it censors in real time. It was built to filter "gambling, shopping, job search, pornography, stock quotes, or other non-business material," but the first question from the Chinese buyers is invariably: Can it stop Falun Gong?

In the wake of terrorist attacks on America, some of the byplay between Beijing and its entrepreneurial suitors has taken on new significance. According to James Mulvenon of Rand Corporation, Network Associates, a U.S. web security firm, gained entry to the Chinese market by helpfully donating 300 live computer viruses to the Public Security Bureau. The U.S. embassy has already monitored the picture.exe virus, which worms into a user's computer and then quietly sabotages the widely available encryption software Pretty Good Privacy by sending the personal encryption keys to China. Last August's notorious Code Red worm, which some thought originated in China, appears to have been little more than an amateur nuisance. But Chinese military reports on unconventional warfare explicitly advocate coordinated virus attacks to debilitate U.S. communication and financial systems during a crisis. America may expect a more sophisticated visit from the offspring of a Network Associates sample virus in the future.

Why has there been so little oversight of such corporate activity? As Michael Robinson puts it, for the first four years of the Net era, those with paranoid visions of China's government were never quite able to square their suspicions with the rapid expansion of the Chinese Internet. Although it was widely rumored in Beijing that up to 30,000 state security employees were monitoring the Internet in that city alone, the monitoring was also laughed at. Apparently the bureaucrats liked monitoring pornography so much that they had a massive backlog. State security was said to be lax, corrupt, full of holes. Chinese whiz kids could still surf through the firewall and beyond. Associations could flourish among the patrons of the cybercaf s, using anonymous monikers. Many saw the Internet as a populist river leading to the ocean of the global community. Then, the Chinese government abruptly built a cyber-version of the Three Gorges Dam.

In October 2000, the State Council ordered Internet Service Providers to hold all Chinese user data--phone numbers, time, and surfing history--for at least 60 days. In November, commercial news sites were banned. In December, the National People's Congress decreed all unauthorized online political activity illegal. January 2001 saw the criminalization of Internet transfer of "state secret information," such as reports of human rights violations. February brought "Internet Police 110," software blocking "cults, sex, and violence" while monitoring users' attempts to access such sites. By March, the surveillance started to work; hundreds of e-mails on the controversy surrounding a schoolhouse bombing in Jiangxi disappeared. Around the same time, Chinese authorities announced near completion of a "black box" to collect all information flowing across the Internet. In April, arrests of democracy activists using the web and a nationwide crackdown on cybercaf s reached critical mass. Surviving caf s had to install internal monitoring software. E-mail to Tibet now took three days to get through, if at all, and Falun Gong e-mail was completely eradicated. By October 2001, when President George W. Bush flew to Shanghai for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, he was entering an Internet police state. To deflect criticism, but perhaps also as a demonstration of power, blocks on U.S. news websites were magically lifted by Chinese authorities. The minute Bush went airborne, the blocks were back in place. During Bush's current visit to China, any attempt to discuss loosening Chinese Internet controls is likely to be brushed aside using the rhetoric of our own struggle against terrorism (what, you're against surveillance?). But if the Chinese take this tack, they are of course being dishonest about their own motives.

There were urgent reasons for the Chinese Internet crackdown; fighting terrorism wasn't one of them. Instead, look to the slow-motion crisis of a leadership transition, the release of the Tiananmen papers, the emergence of a cyber-Falun Gong, and a stirring--you could feel it on the street--for greater freedom of expression, if not genuine democracy. Then again, there may be a more elaborate game afoot. Chairman Mao knew the utility of briefly loosening controls to create a dragnet. In effect, the current Chinese leadership promoted a "hundred flowers" period of relative Internet freedom--again, not to capture terrorists, but to expose anyone who disagreed with the legitimacy of their rule and to attract massive Western investment. American technologies of surveillance, encryption, firewalls, and viruses have now been transferred to Chinese partners--and might even one day be turned against our own ludicrously open Internet. We funded, built, and pushed into China what we thought was a Trojan Horse, but we forgot to build the hatch.

Consider a Chinese user in search of an unblocked news site (weeklystandard.com, for example). He won't expect to get through, and if he does, it will be cause for alarm, for the site may be a tripwire--not for spam, but for state security. Everything he does on the web might conceivably be used against him. Pornography? Potentially, a two-year sentence. Political? Possible permanent loss of career, family, and freedom. E-mail may be the most risky: Two years ago, working from my office in a Chinese TV studio, I received an e-mail from a U.S. friend (in a browser-based Hotmail account, no less, which in theory should be difficult to monitor) with the words "China," "unrest," "labor," and "Xinjiang" in queer half-tone brackets, as if the words had been picked out by a filter. I now realize that it was a warning; any savvy Chinese user would have sensed it instantly.

Before the crackdown one could escape and surf anonymously in a cybercaf  or use a proxy server--another computer that acts as an intermediary between surfers and websites, helping to hide their web footprints and evade the filters. Not surprisingly, the most common search words in China were not "Britney" and "hooters," but "free" and "proxy." Fully 10 percent of Chinese users--about two million people--used proxies regularly in an attempt to circumvent government controls. In what Michael calls "the first sign of cleverness" by the government, a proxy pollution campaign began last spring when the Chinese authorities either developed or imported a system that sniffs the networks for signs of proxies. A user, frantically typing in proxy addresses until he finds one that isn't blocked, effectively provides the government with a tidy blacklist. After a few of these tedious sessions, many of my Chinese friends simply gave up climbing over the firewall. For a small fee, expat users could turn to a web-based proxy browser, such as Anonymizer. But credit cards are effectively blocked for Chinese citizens. Just for good measure, Anonymizer was finally blocked as well.

IS CHINA'S Internet beyond redemption? Is it destined to be a tool of surveillance and repression, managed by the Chinese government and serviced by cynical Western partners? Maybe not. The Great Firewall might be vulnerable to a few physicists at the University of Oregon. I spent a day watching Stephen Hsu diagram the Chinese web and its weaknesses. Hsu and his company, SafeWeb, have developed a proxy server system called Triangle Boy. The triangle refers to the Chinese user, to a fleet of servers outside of the firewall, and to a mothership which the servers report to, but the Chinese government cannot find. Already tens of thousands of Chinese users have connected with it; five of the top twenty Triangle Boy search sites are in the Chinese language. Every day, the Chinese user receives an e-mail listing new addresses of Triangle Boy servers, which allow the user to visit websites that they would otherwise be unable to reach. Because the addresses of the servers change constantly, the system is practically unbeatable. Any attack, especially on the mothership, requires enormous resources.

But as surely as Triangle Boy works to liberate the surfing Chinese masses, you can bet State Security is looking for a way to pounce on this latest proxy rebellion. The simplest one will be to enlist American companies, still eager to curry favor in Beijing, and get them to develop software allowing the Public Security Bureau to sniff out and block proxies as quickly as they are created.

The only practical solution to this puzzle is for the Bush administration to make Internet freedom in China a high priority. At the moment it is a laughably small priority. The Voice of America, whose website has been a high-profile target of Chinese blocking, last summer began funding Triangle Boy to the tune of $10,000 per month. VOA officials undertook that small effort in frustration; they attempt to send daily news via e-mail to some 800,000 addresses in China, with no guarantee that they are getting through. Hsu estimates that supplying one million Chinese users with Triangle Boy (approximately 600 million page views a month) would require just $1 million annually. Budgeted at $300 million a year, VOA has the means and is wisely looking at several other solutions as well. But for VOA to justify an anti-blocking effort on a scale that will make a difference, it will need to be seen as carrying out an important plank of American foreign policy, not just acting on the margins as it is now.

And why not make this a higher profile U.S. policy? Cracking the Chinese firewall is at least as technically interesting as strategic defense. Triangle Boy is still theoretically vulnerable to spoof sites, authorization problems, or a Code Red-style worm attacking the servers. That implies a need for a highly technical layering operation, involving an endless and ever-changing supply of low-key web-based proxies, mirror sites, and encrypted e-mail and instant messenger services in Mandarin, Cantonese, and English, in sufficient volume to overwhelm the Chinese firewall.

Creative engineers, unleashed to solve the problem of bringing Internet freedom to China, might take any number of approaches. They might go through Hong Kong, where illicit cables are said to run to Guangzhou. They might cut some deals with a "loose" Chinese ISP, such as Jitong. They might use messages formatted as images to defeat software that sniffs out characters. They might exploit the fact that Chinese Internet addresses were originally configured in peculiar blocks. Or the fact that the government's proxy-hunters come from only a few locations. A shrewd native engineer could probably root out and defeat 99 percent of these government agents.

None of these measures will be cheap. Nor can we expect the U.S. government to fully manage such a multi-pronged private-and-public defense of Internet freedom. Even if they back the overall concept, administration officials will inevitably want deniability about certain parts of such an operation. This means the project will need to attract the support of foundations, human rights groups, religious organizations--any group that cares about a free China.

But it will be worth it. Given the willingness of capitalists to work hand in hand with the Chinese regime, the Internet may be the only force left that is potentially anti-hierarchical. Think of it as a way to levy a web-based democracy tax on the Chinese government. Think of it also as a way around the university students and the intelligentsia, who are overrated as agents for democratic change in China.

As the father of the Chinese Internet Michael Robinson notes, "In the Chinese Internet's infancy, the first three sites that the government blocked were two anti-government sites--and one Maoist site. What threatens them? . . . The heartland." Ultimately, it won't be the intellectuals who are key to bringing democracy to China. Irate overtaxed peasants with Internet-enabled cell phones ten years from now are the real target market. And those whose dream is democracy in China are operating with diminishing points of entry. The American business presence in China is deeply, perhaps fatally, compromised as an agent for liberalizing change. The Internet remains the strongest force for democracy available to the Chinese people. But it remains a mere potentiality, yet another American dream, unless we first grapple with the question: Who lost China's Internet? Well, we did. But we can still repair the damage. We can, in Michael's words, "lay down the communication network for revolution." If we don't, his progeny may not forgive us.

Ethan Gutmann, a visiting fellow at the Project for the New American Century, is completing a book, "Beijing Boot Camp."