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Products Liability Law in New York

Products liability law in New York began by the contracts disputes where what sellers sold were not what the buyers expected. It was a concern about a promise to give a defect-free product. In Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (1804), the court held that a product seller was not liable to the defects of the product if the seller did not know the defects and expressly warrant the product.

However, in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), where the defendant, a drug provider, gave a wrong medicine to the plaintiff, the court held that the defendant was liable to the injury of the plaintiff because of the nature of his business and the danger to others incident to his mismanagement. Following the same sense, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), the court held that the defendant, a manufacturer of automobiles was liable to the injury caused by a part of an automobile, where the part was not made by the defendant. This is because, in MacPherson, the court thought the defendant had a duty to inspect the part due to the nature of the part to be inspected and the need of caution for the probability of danger.

Somehow, the product liability expended to the injury of the third party in Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195 (1961), where the court held a food provider was liable to the jury of the son of a father who bought food for his son because the warranty’s protection should be granted not only to an individual buyer but also to the members of the buyer’s household. But the “third party” did not mean any non-contractual parties. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432 (1963), the court rejected that the defendant, a parts provider for an airplane manufacturer, was liable to the death of passengers.

In response to the trend of complex technology development, the court began to place on a manufacturer a liability to the injuries of non-users. In Godling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330 (1973), where a car accident was caused by the defect of a car made by a manufacturer, the court held that as long as the defect was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident the manufacturer was liable to the injury of a non-driver. However, the liability had three limitations: (1) when an injury happens, the product is being used for its normal purposes; (2) with reasonable care, the user of the product cannot find the defect and perceive its danger; and (3) with reasonable care, the injured cannot prevent his injuries.

Contrary to the previous cases discussing the contracts law, in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company, 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989), the court began to ignore the contractual relationships between the manufacturer and the injured and instead to introduce the torts law into the theories of product liability. In Hymowitz, where the plaintiff sued for damages the defendant, a drug manufacturer who did not exactly caused the injuries but was one of the injuring parties, the court held that the defendant was liable based on the torts law theories.

In conclusion, the products liability law evolved gradually to a mixture of contracts and torts laws. That is, a cause of action concerning products liability rises from contracts law and is proposed in a way of a torts claim.