尋洋之南。躬耕之境

Considerable criticism has been offered against the rational choice theory. It is always, however, easier to be fussy about a hardly omnipotent theory than provide suggestions that strengthen the explanatory power of the theory.

This paper argues that the rational choice theory should be revised rather than dumped all together with its naïve assumption of diehard utility maximizers. We have seen a successfully revised version of the rational choice theory in Herbert Simon’s scheme, namely, the theory of bounded rationality. This reaction paper develops a revision of the rational choice theory in light of the useful theoretical discussion provided by Elinor Ostrom in his article. My revised version of the rational choice theory then will be shown to be applicable in the empirical contexts where the effectiveness of private schools in America and Taiwan are examined.

The rational choice theory considers decision-making at a micro-level but the reason why many rational choice scholars have difficulty explaining the macro-level reality is that they equal the “aggregated” individual decisions with the macro level reality. In fact, aggregated individual decisions account for only very little of the macro-level reality. This corresponds to why Teske and his colleagues, in their attempt to defend the utility of the Tiebout model, acknowledge the fact that the indifference of many individual consumers oddly leads to the great efficiency in the supply of public goods in polycentric regions.

A failure to explain this odd causality is not due to the complete futileness of the Tiebout model. Neither is it because, as Teske and his colleagues argue, marginal consumers force local government to make reasonable policies, such as developing a mechanism to guarantee profitable house values for sellers, which in turn benefits indifferent neighbors.

The Tiebout model and its underlying theory, the rational choice theory, discount their explanatory powers in that they have regarded mistakenly the aggregated individual behaviors as the macro-level reality.
Then, what is a major factor that makes the aggregated individual decisions unable to account for the macro level outcome? The answer is “institution.” Institution consists of more than, say, the arrangement of a government or the types of school.

According to Ostrom, institution also consists of rules, norms and strategies. At the macro level, aggregated individual decisions are likely to be swayed due to institutional factors. Even at the micro level, individual decisions are frequently influenced by institutional factors. Ostrom mentions the “attributes of the community” and a good case of it is “culture.” In many conditions, institutional factors, rules and norms in particular, can contribute to a unique culture.This argument leads to the notion that two different macro-level outcomes occur even when both of those outcomes have the same assumption of individual rationality at their micro-level contexts.

Chubb and Moe's article gives us a good chance to explain the macro-micro disparity described above. Regarding the academic performance of students, private schools outperform public schools in America. But this situation is quite the opposite in Taiwan (and even in many European countries.) Private high schools in both America and Taiwan have similarities in their high tuition rates, homogenous student populations, autonomous leeway used by principals to hire and fire teachers and the opportunities for parents to “vote with their feet” if they do not like a private school.

Then why are the private schools significantly less academically effective than the public schools in Taiwan? A major reason is that good students in Taiwan are more likely to attend public schools. The belief in Confucianism, a culture factor, tells those academically successful Taiwanese students that tax money “should” be spent to cover your tuition; more importantly, public opinion in Taiwan often supports this idea.

But the opposite situation happened in Taiwan does not mean that the Chubb and Moe’s model is not at work. Ostrom in his article tells us about the differentiation between models, theories and frameworks. I argue that researchers of the school effectiveness in Taiwan and America should have two different frameworks and accordingly two different tailored-made models. At the micro-level, the parents in both America and Taiwan are rational in sending their children to “quality” schools.

But at the macro level, the institutional factors, by which two different cultures are created, determine the perceived “quality schools” in America to be private schools and in Taiwan public schools. But it should be noted that adults in Taiwan who have children who need school education might not be the majority and perhaps the majority is indifferent to the matter of what a quality school is. Thus it is unreasonable to regard the general understanding of sending good children to public schools as the aggregated outcome of individual decisions. Again, institution, in this case culture, explains the macro level reality.